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Dear Mr. Shea: 
I wish to advise the court that the appellant has recently 
become aware of a Utah Supreme Court case that the appellant 
believes is an authority which supports Point II of the 
appellant's argument before the Court of Appeals. The case in 
question is Joan F. Stephens v. Brent Henderson, 63 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10 (Ut. August 13, 1987) The appellant believes the 
discussion by the court of a requested jury instruction 
concerning assumption of risk, supports the argument made in 
Point II of the appellant's brief. 
This notice is being given pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Sincerely, 
Robert A. Echard 
Attorney for Appellant 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The jury's verdict and finding of no negligence was 
contrary to the facts in evidence and manifestly unjust. 
2. The trial court's instruction to the jury that the 
plaintiff was required to avoid a hazardf constituted a 
prejudical error which misled the jury and thereby resulted in a 
verdict contrary to the evidence. 
3. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's 
motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence 
to justify the verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff/appellant, Lucinda Deats, (hereinafter 
referred to as Mrs. Deats) initiated this action against the 
defendant/respondent, Commercial Security Bank, (hereinafter 
referred to as the bank) to recover for personal injuries 
received as a result of a slip and fall occurring on February 27, 
1984, at a parking terrace owned and operated by Commercial 
Security Bank. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action 
finding that the bank was not negligent. (R.352) The plaintiff 
filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure alleging that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify the verdict, that there was irregularity 
in the proceedings of the jury, and that the court committed an 
error in law with reference to Instruction No. 25 requiring Mrs. 
Deats to avoid a hazard. The trial court denied plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial and Mrs. Deats now appeals. 
Plaintiff/appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment below 
and a remand to the district court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the accident giving rise to this cause of 
action, Mrs. Deats was a 31 year old staff clerk employed by the 
United States Forest Service at 324 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah. 
(T.523-525) Mrs. Deats purchased a parking permit from the bank 
allowing her to park her car during all hours of the day on the 
fourth level of the Commercial Security Bank parking terrace 
across the street from her place of employment. (T.525, 528) (See 
also plaintiff's Exhibit 1) The fourth level of the parking 
terrace was uncovered, while the three lower levels were covered 
areas. (T.528) 
Mrs. Deats had only parked in the parking terrace on a 
couple of occasions because her children had been ill and in the 
hospital and she had not attended work on a regular basis. After 
having been off work for approximately a week, Mrs. Deats parked 
her vehicle on the parking terrace on the 27th day of February, 
1984, which was a Monday morning. Mrs. Deats arrived for work at 
approximately 7:05 a.m. (T.529, 530) The bank was aware that 
individuals who parked in the terrace came to work as early as 
7:00 a.m. (T.532, 602, 714) The president of the bank often came 
to work that early although he did not park on the upper level of 
the parking terrace. (T.620, 624, 625) The employee who had the 
responsibility of spreading salt and sand for the bank began work 
at approximately 6:30 a.m. (T.612, 823, 834, 835) 
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Mrs. Deats was apparently the first person to arrive that 
day. (T.532, 533) Upon arrival Mrs. Deats drove up the ramp to 
the fourth level and at the top of the ramp felt her car slide 
slightly as she turned onto the fourth level. (T.534) Mrs. 
Deats proceeded to park her car backing into a stall to 
facilitate her exit that afternoon. (T.539-540) Mrs. Deats, 
wearing "moonboots", then exited her vehicle and proceeded 
approximately half way to the stair well when she decided to turn 
around and move her car so as to prevent the possibility of it 
being struck due to the slippery conditions and narrowing of the 
parking area. As Mrs. Deats approached the front of her car, she 
slipped and fell sustaining severe injuries to her left knee. 
(T.540-542, 732, 737-739, 754-761) After Mrs. Deats was injured, 
she observed the maintenance man arrive on the upper level. 
(T.544, 546) Mrs. Deats had no reasonable alternative other than 
to park in her designated spot. Because of the early morning 
hours she was fearful of parking in other parts of the downtown 
city because of transients and because there were no places where 
she would be able to park more than two hours without receiving a 
citation. (T.525, 526) i 
A large accumulation of snow and ice had been pushed to 
the outside edges of the upper parking terrace. This snow would 
melt during the daytime and because of inadequate drainage would 
freeze on the parking terrace overnight often causing a sheet of 
ice to exist on the parking terrace the following morning. 
(T.603, 711-714, 839-841) The bank was aware of this condition 
and kept sand and salt for the purpose of treating the ice. The 
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weekend preceding February 27, 1984, a Monday, consisted of warm 
days and cold nights so that the snow and ice that had 
accumulated would have melted during the day and frozen at night. 
The bank was aware of this situation, but did not close the 
parking terrace, did not treat the parking terrace early enough 
to avert the injury received by Mrs. Deats and did not warn Mrs. 
Deats of the danger. (T.847-852) 
The bank's agents, Mr. Lollie and Mr. Fuitt, testified at 
trial that during the winter of 1983-84 they noticed the snow 
melt, freezing of water, and drainage problems surrounding the 
top level of the bank's parking terrace. Both testified that a 
sheet of ice was created by melting snow and subsequent freezing. 
(T.631-633, 839-840) Both further testified that they understood 
the danger involved to invitees using the parking terrace and 
walking in the area. (T.634-635, 839, 847) Mr. Fuitt, the bank's 
agent in charge of maintenance, also testified that it was his 
practice to begin salting, sanding, or servicing the parking 
terrace between 7:30 a.m. and 7:45 a.m. and would begin servicing 
the area earlier only if there had been a heavy snow the evening 
before. (T.826, 827) Mr. Fuitt further testified that it was not 
his duty to service the parking terrace on weekends and would 
only do so if there had been a major storm on the weekend. 
(T.841) Mr. Lollie, the bank's parking attendant, also testified 
that on a few occasions he would salt and sand the top level of 
the parking terrace upon his arrival for work at 8:00 a.m. 
because the terrace had not yet been serviced and conditions were 
unsafe. (T.634-637) 
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The morning Mrs* Deats fell, the top level of the terrace 
was covered with ice, the surface area had not been salted or 
sanded and there was nothing to indicate that the bank had begun 
servicing the area in any way despite bank's agents having 
knowledge of the possibility of an unnatural accumulation of ice 
due to the snow melt and drainage problems, and despite bank's 
agent knowing that the icy condition was difficult to see and 
appreciate. (T.540-542, 634-635, 711-714 841, 847-848) In spite 
of the fact that the bank's agents had knowledge of the icy 
conditions, appreciated the danger, and knew that invitees often 
arrived at early hours, the parking terrace was not salted or 
sanded on a regular basis until 7:30 a.m. to 7:45 a.m. and on 
occasion not until after 8:00 a.m. and after the arrival of 
several vehicles. (T.635-637) Further, the bank posted no 
warnings or safety notices concerning the dangerous condition 
despite the fact that icy condition existed on and off from 
November, 1983 through February, 1984. (T.638, 720-723, 848) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The evidence presented at the time of trial demonstrated 
the bank's negligence as a matter of law. However, the jury 
failed to apportion negligence among the parties despite the 
court's further instructions to do so. The finding of the jury 
that the bank was not negligent was based upon Instruction No. 25 
which required Mrs. Deats to avoid the hazard regardless of the 
bank's negligence. This determination resulted in the jury's 
applying a contributory negligence standard as a result of Mrs. 
Deats's alleged failure to avoid a hazard. A requirement that 
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Mrs, Deats avoid the hazard clearly constitutes prejudicial error 
in law in that it misstated Mrs. Deats' required duty of care and 
confused the jury. The trial court erred in denying Mrs. Deats1 
motion for new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence 
to justify the verdict and error in law. Therefore, the 
appellant respectfully requests that this court remand this 
matter to the trial court for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE 
THE JURY1 S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE 
The jury's verdict and finding of no negligence is 
contrary to evidence, unreasonable, and unjust. In Nelson v. 
Truj-illo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court of Utah 
held that the denial of a motion for new trial will be upheld on 
appeal unless, "the evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make 
the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." See also McCloud 
v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). Applying this standard 
to the case at hand, it is clear from the evidence that the bank 
was at least partially negligent. The standard of care required 
of a business invitor was well defined in the court's 
Instructions Numbers 18, 19, and 20. A business invitor must 
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, must make 
timely and periodic inspection for existing defects, must 
seasonably repair all defects which endanger invitees, or must 
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warn the invitee of the condition and risks involved therein. 
Rest. Torts 2d 341A, 343 and comments (b) and (e); See also, 
Woolston v. Wells, 687 P.2d 144 (Or. 1984); Lannon v. Taco Bell, 
inc. , 708 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1985). 
The evidence is undisputed that on February 27, 1984 the 
bankfs agent had not applied salt or sand to the terrace, had not 
made previous inspection of the terrace the weekend before, and 
had made no other efforts to remove or alleviate the icy 
condition despite having knowledge of the dangerous condition 
created by the melting slow and ice. (T.542, 840-842, 845, 
847-848) In addition, the bank did not close of the terrace or 
give notice of the dangerous condition. (T.847-852) This being 
the case, the evidence is so slight and unconvincing that the 
verdict rendered was "plainly unreasonable and unjust." The jury 
made no attempt to apportion negligence between the parties 
despite overwhelming evidence of the bank's negligence. As 
indicated in the affidavits of the jurors, the jury concluded 
that Mrs. Deats was required to avoid the parking terrace 
entirely and, therefore, the bank was not negligent. (R.375-378) 
Even without the benefit of the affidavits of the two 
jurors, an examination of the evidence and the required duty of a 
business invitor clearly indicates that the jury's finding of no 
negligence on behalf of the bank is contrary to law. The bank 
failed to warn, failed to inspect, failed to remove, and failed 
to salt or sand the icy condition despite having knowledge of its 
presence and despite knowing that the dangerous condition was 
difficult to see and appreciate. This being the case, the jury's 
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verdict of no cause of action and finding of no negligence is 
plainly unreasonable and this court should remand the case for a 
new trial. 
POINT II 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 25 CONSTITUTES AN ERROR IN LAW SINCE IT 
MISSTATES THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUIRED DUTY OF CARE. 
Instruction No. 25 states that: 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has the duty 
of seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard 
which is plainly visible, and if the plaintiff 
reasonably failed to do so, then the plaintiff is 
negligent either in failing to look or in failing to 
head what he or she saw. 
The only Utah case that the appellant can find which tends to 
support the language of Instruction No. 25 is Whitman v. W. T. 
Grant <Io. , 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964). In that case the 
plaintiff attempted to recover for injuries he suffered from 
falling down an elevator shaft in a department store. A summary 
judgment was granted because the plaintiff's statement showed 
that he was contributorily negligent. At that time contributory 
negligence was a total bar to recovery. Addressing the issue of 
contributory negligence, the Court stated as follows: 
The plaintiff is confronted with the basic 
proposition that when there is a hazard which is 
plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged with the 
duty of seeing and avoiding it. And if he fails to 
do so, it is concluded that he was negligent either 
in failing to look, or in failing to heed what he 
saw. In so saying here, we have not lost sight of 
certain principles which we recognize as modifying 
this rule under proper circumstances, but which upon 
application to the facts here shown do not bring 
about the results contented for by the plaintiff. 
The first of these is that in applying the 
universally accepted standard of care: That of the 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man under the 
circumstances, .... " 
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The Whitman case refers to the case of Richard v. 
Andersonf 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959), a case involving an 
automobile accident and the issue of whether the plaintiff saw 
what was plain to be seen. Whitman defined the standard of care 
to which a plaintiff is held as "...the degree of caution for his 
own safety that an ordinary prudent person would (exercise) under 
the circumstances." It should be noted that the Richards case 
was also decided under contributory negligence which barred a 
recovery by a plaintiff. The appellant has been unable to find 
any recent Utah Supreme Court case which justifies or supports 
the law as stated in Instruction No. 25. 
Generally in a slip and fall case, the plaintiff having a 
knowledge of the presence of snow or ice is charged with the duty 
of exercising a degree of care commensurate with such knowledge. 
However, knowledge of the presence of snow and ice is only a 
circumstance to be considered by the jury along with other 
evidence in determining if the plaintiff exercised due care. 
Gri-zzel- v. Foxx, 348 SW 2d 815 (1961) . Mere knowledge of an icy 
condition before passing over it does not establish negligence on 
the part of a business invitee. The test is whether an invitee, 
knowing of the icy condition, reasonably believed or had the 
right to believe that he or she could use the pathway safely by 
the exercise of reasonable care. Isaacson v. ffusson College, 297 
A 2d 98 (1972). In other words, a business invitee is also held 
to the standard of exercising reasonable care for his own 
protection. The standard of care to be used is that of an 
ordinary prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. 
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Meni-sh v-, Pollrrcrer Company, 356 A. 2d 323 (1976) . An invitee is 
not contributorily negligent unless she unreasonably exposes 
herself to a risk of bodily harm. Ti chenor v.- Lohaus, 322 NW 2d 
629 (Nebraska 1982). 
Instruction No. 25 imposes a duty upon the plaintiff of 
seeing and avoiding a hazard and suggests that the plaintiff is 
barred from recovery if she fails to avoid the icy condition of 
the parking terrace regardless of whether or not she exercised 
reasonable care in her attempt to traverse the area. The 
affidavits submitted from two of the jury members clearly 
indicate that the jury believed that was the import of 
Instruction No. 25 and therefore did not attempt to apportion any 
negligence between the parties or determine if the bank was 
negligent. Clearly the attention of the jury should be focused 
on whether a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of due 
care would have incurred the risk, despite her knowledge of it 
and, if so, whether she would have conducted herself in a manner 
in which the plaintiff acted in light of all surrounding 
circumstances including the appreciated risk. Jacobsen 
Co nst ru ct ion-Company v-. -•Strtxcbo-Lite- Englneerrngy lire. , 619 P. 2d 
306 (Utah 1980) Then, if the plaintiff's unreasonableness is 
viewed to be less than that of the defendant, any damages allowed 
must be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributed to the plaintiff. 
The appellant's counsel strenuously objected to 
Instruction No. 25 prior to the submission to the jury 
specifically because of the fear it would result in the jury 
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feeling that they had no option but to deny Mrs. Deats recovery 
if she failed to avoid the danger. Under the circumstances, it 
is apparent that the jury failed to follow the instructions or 
the special verdict form. This court must not disregard the 
import of Instruction No. 25 simply because the trial court 
included instructions to the jury defining the bank's duties, but 
should recognize the error and its effect upon the jury's 
decision. Instruction No. 25 constituted a prejudicial error 
which misled the jury and misstated plaintiff's duty of care. 
Therefore, plaintiff's motion for new trial should have been 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully requests that this court remand 
this case to the district court for new trial on the basis that 
an error in law was committed which resulted in an improper 
finding of no negligence and no cause of action, and on the basis 
that the jury's verdict was plainly unreasonable and contrary to 
the evidence presented as a matter of law. 
DATED this day of October, 1986. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a copy of the foregoing Brief was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this day of October, 1986, to Donald J. 
Purser and J. Angus Edwards, Attorneys for Commercial Security 
Bank, 340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has the duty of 
seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly 
visible, and if the plaintiff reasonably failed to do so, then 
the plaintiff is negligent either in failing to look or in 
failing to heed what he or she saw. 
Q Q 0 
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COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case No. 90084 
We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-
entitled casef give the following answers to the questions 
propounded to us. 
QUESTION NO. 1: At the time and place of the accident 
in question and under the circumstances as shown by the 




(If you answered Question No. 1 "yes", answer the following 
question. If you answered it "no", you need not answer any 
further questions.) 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the negligence, if any, of 
Commercial Security Bank, a proximate cause of the accident? 
YES 
NO 
(If you have answered both Question 1 and 2 "yes", answ 
Question No. 3. If you have answered Question 2 "no", you nee 
not answer any further questions.) 
Page 2 
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QUESTION NO, -3: At the time and place of the accident 
in question and under the circumstances as shown by the 
evidence, was the plaintiff, Cindy Deatsf negligent? 
YES 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the negligence, if any, of Cindy 
Deats, a proximate cause of the accident? 
YES 
NO 
(If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "yes" and Questions 3 
and 4 "yes", answer the following question.) 
QUESTION NO. 5: Considering all the negligence which 
caused the accident at 100%, which percentage of that negligence 
is attributable to: 
CINDY DEATS: % 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK: % 
TOTAL: 100% 
QUESTION NO. 6: What sum would fairly compensate the 
plaintiff, Cindy Deats, for the damages, if any, which she 
sustained as a result of the accident? 
SPECIAL DAMAGES: $ 
GENERAL DAMAGES: $ 
DATED this &Q*1 day of March, 1986. 
CfrvnJU Qio> ^ u / T 
FOREMAN 
o 53 
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FOWLER & MOXLEY 
Attorneys for Commercial Security Bank 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9841 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY DEATS, ) 
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v . 






ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 90084 
The above-styled cause of action was tr ied before a ju ry of eight (8) 
members on March 18 and 20, 1986. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, 
Robert A. Echard and defendant, Commercial Security Bank, was represented 
by its counsel, Donald J . Purser. After plaint i f f and defendant rested their 
respective cases, the ju ry was provided with the Court's instructions and 
fur ther provided with a special verdict form. The j u r y , having found that 
under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, the defendant, Commercial 
Security Bank was not negligent, the complaint in the above-styled case is 
hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits, costs to be taxed 
against plaint i f f . 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this «2L_ day of / ^ ^ < ^ , 1986. 
R O T H . 
Distr ict Court Judge 
97b48 
42^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^£P__ day of March, 1986, I served the 
foregoing Order of Judgment upon the following, by depositing copies 
thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert A. Echard 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
1 fy/sJrj^yr ^L. 
97b49
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ROBERT A* ECHAHD, 953 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
801-621-3317 
APR 17 2 u3 PM f88 
WEBER COUHTV CLERK 
RICHARD R.GREENE 
(8/-" 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 








Civil No. 90084 
AW OFFICE OF 
idley, Echard 
&Ward 
i - 25TH STREET 
DEN, UTAH 84401 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
S3 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
JULIA ETCHEVERHY, being first duly sworn upon her oath, 
deposes and says: 
.1 •; . That your affiant has personal knowledge of the 
information contained in this affidavit and is fully competent to 
so testify. 
2% That your affiant was one of the jury members in the 
above-captioned lawsuit. 
3» That when the jury retired to the jury room, the jury 
reviewed the instructions until they came to Instruction No. 25 
which required the plaintiff to avoid the hazard. At that point 
in time the majority of the jury concluded that since the 
375 
plaintiff had to avoid the hazard, erid bha-fe, consequently, the 
bank should have no responsibility for the plaintiff's injury. 
4. That based upon Instruction No. 25, the jury 
concluded that it would answer the special interrogatories by 
indicating that the defendant was not negligent. The jury did 
not at any time attempt to assess the amount of negligence that 
might be attributable to the plaintiff and the amount of 
negligence that might be attributed to the defendant. 
DATED this /7 day of April, 1986. 
^L^L 
JULIA ETCHEVERRY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this H& day of 
April, 1986, by JULIA ETCHEVERRY to be her voluntary act and 
deed. 
iSi? PUBJJTC '•" 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires 
LuJV^ 
iJ%&\/te 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT, postage prepaid, to Donald J. Purser and 
J. Angus Edwards, Attorneys for Commercial Security Bank, 340 
East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this )^H^ day of 
April, 1986. l 
SECRETARY 
LAW OFFICE OF 
irridley, Echart 
&Ward 
635 - 25TH STREET 
DGDEN. UTAH 8440 
- 2 -
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ROBERT A. ECHAHD, 953 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
801-621-3317 
WEBER CGuVrY CLERK U P 
RICHARD R.GREENE 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 




COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendant* 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES SWEET 
C i v i l No. 90084 
LAW OFFICE OF 
rridley, Echart 
&Ward 
I35 - 25TH STREE1 
GDEN, UTAH 844C 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
CHARLES SWEET, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of the 
information contained in this affidavit and is fully competent to 
so testify. 
2+ That your affiant was one of the jury members in the 
above-captioned lawsuit and acted as foreman of said jury. 
3. That the jury reviewed the jury instructions and six 
of the jury members decided because of Instruction No. 25 the 
defendant had the obligation to avoid a hazard; and, 
consequently, should not have parked on the upper parking 
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terrace. Based upon Instruction No. 25 the jury answered the 
interrogatories stating that the bank was not negligent, 
4. That your affiant and one of the other jury members 
attempted to get the jury to apportion negligence between the 
defendant and plaintiff, but the remaining jury members felt that 
it was unnecessary because of the instruction requiring the 
plaintiff to avoid the hazard, 
5» That your affiant did not vote with the majority of 
the jury in this regard, 
DATED this / 7^day of April, 1986. 
CHARLES SWEET 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lTt±fo day of April, 
1986 by CHARLES SWEET to be his voluntary act and deed. 
NOT ATT PUBLIC, Dgd'en, Dt 
My Commission Expires 
U ayh , 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a copy of the foregoing affidavit was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this day of April, 1986, to Donald 
J. Purser and J. Angus Edwards, Attorneys for Commercial Security 
Bank, 340 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
HT7E-
Sff&irffTARY 
LAW OFFICE OF 
ridley, Echard 
&Ward 
IS - 25TH STREET 
3DEN, UTAH 84401 
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DONALD J . PURSER, #2663 
FOWLER S PURSER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9841 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY DEATS, 
Plaintiff, 
- v s - . 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 90084 
On June 2, 1986, p la in t i f f s motion for vacation of the jury 's findings of 
fact and entry of judgment thereon was heard by this Court. Plaintiff was 
represented by Richard Echard and Commercial Security Bank was 
represented by Donald J . Purser. 
The court reviewed the arguments, both writ ten and ora l , submitted by 
plaint i f f and defendant. It should be noted that the undersigned judge was 
the tr ial judge in this ju ry t r i a l . 
The court finds that there were sufficient evidentiary facts provided to 
the Court and the jury to support their verdict that u [ a ] t the time and place 
of the accident in question and under the circumstances as shown by the 
evidence . . . " Commercial Security Bank was not negligent. The Court 
fur ther finds that while p la in t i f fs counsel complains that Instruction No. 25 
misstates the law, in fact Instruction No. 25 simply relates to the standard of 
care owed by the plaint i f f while there were several jury instructions provided 
to the jury defining the standard to support a f inding for negligence of the 
* * 
defendant. Jury Instruction No. 25, the Court f inds, does not misstate the 
law. 
The Court additionally finds that the verdict of the jury did not result 
from irregularit ies in the proceeding or by any misconduct of one or more of 
the ju ry members. 
Plaint i f fs motion for a new tr ial is denied. 
• DATED this / O day of June, 1986. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order to the following: 
Robert A. Echard, Esq. 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
lis "T thi ~ day of June, 1986, postage prepaid. 
^/^cd^ut c^^On^X 
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